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Abstract:  
 
The article focuses on the constitutional linkages between national legal orders, the EU legal order, 
and the ECHR Convention system. The first, and the main, question the article addresses is how these 
intertwined constitutional structures can be described. This article shows that the interrelationship of 
these legal orders could be best described as heterarchical as opposed to hierarchical. The article also 
tries to tentatively examine the meaning and influence of these heterarchical constitutional structures. 
The concept of heterarchy is used to illustrate the tension between constitutionalism and pluralism. 
Where constitutionalism builds a pre-set foundation and framework for governance, pluralism 
challenges hierarchical constitutional structures and highlights tension at the interfaces between 
different legal orders. The concept of heterarchical constitutional structures is used to describe those 
structures pertaining between legal orders which enable those legal orders to flexibly function together 
without predetermining any hierarchical relation between the orders. Thus heterarchical 
constitutional structures can be described as communicative in nature. The structures could also be 
described soft by their nature since they describe, but do not determine relations between different legal 
orders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The European legal space consists of various different legal orders: national legal orders, 
the EU legal order, the ECHR Convention system, the United Nations legal system, WTO 
law and others. This article focuses on the constitutional linkages between national legal 
orders, the EU legal order, and the ECHR Convention system. The first, and the main, 
question the article addresses is how these intertwined constitutional structures can be 
described. This article shows that the interrelationship of these legal orders could be best 
described as heterarchical as opposed to hierarchical. The article also tries to tentatively 
examine the meaning and influence of these heterarchical constitutional structures.  
 
In section two the concept of heterarchy is used to illustrate the tension between 
constitutionalism and pluralism. Where constitutionalism builds a pre-set foundation and 
framework for governance, pluralism challenges hierarchical constitutional structures and 
highlights tension at the interfaces between different legal orders. The concept of 
heterarchical constitutional structures is used to describe those structures pertaining between 
legal orders which enable those legal orders to flexibly function together without 
predetermining any hierarchical relation between the orders. Thus heterarchical 
constitutional structures can be described as communicative in nature. The structures could 
also be described soft by their nature since they describe, but do not determine relations 
between different legal orders. 
 
Three interrelationships in the following three sections exhibit heterarchical constitutional 
structures. The article studies the principle of primacy, the doctrine on conforming 
interpretation, Member States as the masters of the treaties, and the principle of sincere co-
operation in the relationship between EU and national legal orders. The doctrine of margin 
of appreciation is examined in the relationship between the ECHR Convention system and 
national legal orders. Finally, the principle of equivalent protection and the doctrine of 
margin of appreciation are considered in the relation between the EU and the ECHR 
Convention system. 
 
The last section draws upon previous sections and attempts to analytically answer a second 
research question: what is the jurisprudential impact of these heterarchical constitutional 
structures? Examples are drawn from the field of criminal law because of its close relation 
to national sovereignty and constitutional law. The main argument here is that a doctrine of 
sources of law needs to be reconsidered. In short, a rigid and pre-set doctrine of sources of 
law no longer satisfies today’s pluralistic and heterarchical demands.  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The theoretical framework of this Article consists of two isms. First, constitutionalism, 
which means a will to exercise state power within a constitutional framework, or in other 
words, governance within pre-set conditions.1 Constitutionalism is usually described as 
being about limiting the use of power by its division (legislature, executive and judiciary) 
through recourse to the principle of the rule of law, and by fundamental and human rights 
                                                          
1 Dieter Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World’ in Petra
Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 3–5. 
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provisions.2  Constitutionalism recognises the people (demos) as a legitimising source for 
state powers.3 And second, pluralism, which in short is about recognizing the plurality of 
legal orders, their partial overlapping nature, and their rival claims over authority.  
 
Pluralism is not so much an attribute of law but rather an attribute of the social realm: a 
single social realm is affected by more than one legal order.4 Pluralism recognises the 
different legal and normative systems but its aim is not to create or suggest hierarchical 
structures between them.5 According to Daniel Halberstam, pluralism manifests itself 
especially well in the plurality of claims made over authority. It does not seek to settle the 
claims in one order, but instead is concerned about the accommodation persisting between 
different institutions and systems in the absence of settled hierarchical structures.6  
 
Legal reality clearly eschews the idea of one singular legal order in one geographical area or 
in one social realm. In addition to state actors, different international organisations, such as 
the UN, and different treaty organisations, such as different human rights treaties and 
organisations, are part of the pluralistic legal field.7  Since the pluralism of legal orders 
includes different organisations in addition to states, one can speak of the fragmentation of 
the constitutional field. Fragmentation in this context means that some legal orders are 
oriented only to specific tasks, and not to the entirety of tasks over which the states have 
control. The legal orders are separate from each other, but in legal reality they overlap and 
closely bound up with each other. Some of those legal orders might even share heterarchical 
constitutional structures. 
 
As a response to increasing international activity among states,8 or perhaps because of the 
compensatory and reconstructionist need for constitutionalism arising from the 
compromises that it has undergone at the national level,9 the idea of constitutionalism has 
settled on the international or transnational level. Interdependence between states has 
increased and public interests are regulated increasingly beyond the states’ constitutional 
framework.10 As a theoretical position, constitutional pluralism recognises that states are 
not the sole source of constitutional authority. There are also other post-state sites of 
constitutional authority.11  
 
Neil Walker has argued that the relationship between states and other sites of constitutional 
authority is best understood as heterarchical rather than hierarchical.12 And specifically in 
                                                          
2 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and Diversity: An Introduction’ 
(1992–1993) 14 Cardozo L Rev 497. 
3 Grimm (n 1) 9. 
4 John Griffiths, ’What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 J L Pluralism & Unofficial L 1, 12; Gunther Teubner, 
’The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1991–1992) 13 Cardozo L Rev 1443, 1457, 1448. 
5 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global Legal Pluralism’ (2006–2007) 80 Southern California L Rev 1155, 1166. 
6 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Local, Global and Plural Constitutionalism’ in Gráinne de Búrca and JHH Weiler (eds), 
The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2012) 175. 
7 Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Globalisation and Legal Pluralism’ (2002) 4 Intl L FORUM du Droit 
International 19, 21. 
8 Grimm (n 1) 3–4. 
9 Anne Peters, ‘The Merits of Global Constitutionalism’ (2009) 16 Indiana J of Global L Studies 397, 404–405; 
Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International 
Norms and Structures’, (2006) 19 Leiden J Intl L 579; Anne Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism Revisited’ 
(2005) 11 Intl L Theory 39, 40. 
10 Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism Revisited’ (n 9) 41. 
11 Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart 
Publishing 2003) 4; Neil Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 MLR 317. 
12 ibid. 
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relation to EU it has been argued that the EU and the Member States have only partial 
constitutional jurisdiction, because the constitutional field in Europe is manifold and 
overlapping.13 The Union and the individual Member States could be seen to be creating a 
new kind of hybrid constitutional jurisdiction or sovereignty which is sometimes described 
as heterarchical rather than hierarchical.14 The concept of heterarchy is used to describe the 
new challenges of constitutionalism in the European area, but the denotation and semantics 
of heterarchy in this context has remained somewhat ambiguous. The word derives from 
the Greek words heteros (the other, different) and archē (meaning sovereignty). Whereas 
hierarchical constitutional structures suggest vertical, pyramid-like power structures and 
the existence of a single absolute highest authority in one area, the sovereign in the 
traditional sense, the concept of heterarchy could be used to describe a relatively new and 
different kind of sovereignty or reign that can be detected in European constitutional 
structures.  
 
The concept of heterarchy then can be used to describe the tension between constitutionalism 
and pluralism. Where constitutionalism builds a pre-set foundation and framework for 
governance, pluralism challenges hierarchical constitutional structures and highlights 
tension at the interfaces between different legal orders. The concept of heterarchical 
constitutional structures is used to describe those structures pertaining between legal orders 
which enable those legal orders to flexibly function together without predetermining any 
hierarchical relation between the orders. Thus heterarchical constitutional structures can be 
described as communicative in nature. The structures could also be described soft by their 
nature since they describe, but do not determine relations between different legal orders. 
 
One can picture the interrelationship between the legal orders by using the image of an 
onion. The most general system is the ECHR Convention system, in the sense that it sets 
minimum requirements for the national legal orders and for the EU legal order, and thus 
the ECHR Convention system constitutes the outermost layer of the onion. EU law sets 
requirements for national legal orders but not for the ECHR Convention system, thus 
constituting the middle layer of the onion. And finally, the national legal orders need to 
follow the requirements of both the ECHR Convention system and EU law, and thus they 
are located at the inner core of the onion. However, when considered in terms of function, 
the national legal orders constitute the outermost layer of the onion. The national legal 
orders manage a diversity of tasks, some of which are not related to the EU’s competence or 
the ECHR Convention system. In functional terms, the EU constitutes the middle layer, 
leaving the ECHR Convention system as the innermost layer or core of the onion, since the 
ECHR’s functions cover solely human rights issues.   
 
3. HETERARCHICAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES: EU LAW – NATIONAL 
LAW 
 
There are a few principles in EU law which illustrate the heterarchical constitutional 
structures between the European Union and the individual Member States. The premise is 
that constitutionalism and pluralism are not mutually exclusive. The constitutions of the 
                                                          
13 Neil Walker and Stephen Tierney, ‘Introduction: A Constitutional Mosaic? Exploring the New Frontiers of 
Europe’s Constitutionalism’, in Neil Walker, Jo Shaw and Stephen Tierney (eds), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic 
(Hart Publishing 2011) 9. 
14 ibid; Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (n 11); Matej Avbelj, ‘Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law 
– (Why) Does It Matter?’ (2011) 17 ELJ 744; Inger-Johanne Sand, ‘Constitutionalism and the Multi-Coded 
Treaties of the EU: Changing the Concepts of Constitutionality’ in Kaarlo Tuori and Suvi Sankari (eds), The 
Many Constitutions of Europe (Ashgate 2010) 52–53. 
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Union and the individual Member States can be seen as separate but at the same time as 
inseparable and integral owing to the communicative heterarchical constitutional principles.  
The constitutionalization of EU law is often linked to the CJEU’s case law which has aimed 
to strengthen the effectiveness of EU law,15  such as case law concerning primacy. The 
principle of effectiveness in EU law can be seen to derive from CJEU’s case law but also a 
priori from the principle of loyalty. The EU constitution is perceived to be a collection of 
the norms that create a foundation for the European Union’s legal order: the norms 
concerning the EU’s institutions and their functions, the fundamental rights norms, and the 
fundamental principles and doctrines of the EU law enshrined in the EU primary law or 
recognised by the CJEU. The most important constitutional documents are the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
the accession treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union.  The 
EU constitution is functionalized differently when compared with national constitutions 
since it covers relatively few of the tasks that are usually bound by state constitutions. The 
EU constitution is oriented in fulfilling the purpose of the Union. The objectives of the EU 
are the promotion of the Union's values, peace and security, and the establishment of the 
area of freedom, security and justice, the internal market, and the economic and monetary 
union (Article 3 TEU). The EU constitution contains also several provisions concerning the 
allocation of competences between the EU and the Member States. 
 
The communicative heterarchical constitutional principles build linkages between the EU 
constitution and the national constitutions, thus intertwining these constitutional orders 
one with the other. The heterarchical constitutional structures make the Union constitution 
an integral part of national constitutions. However, there is no strict hierarchical 
interrelationship between these legal orders. The legal orders of the Union and the 
individual Member States seem to be parallel and complementary. In a similar way Miguel 
Poiares Maduro has used the concept of counterpunctual law to describe EU constitutional 
law, meaning that the relationship between the legal orders of the Union and the Member 
States is not hierarchical.16 Four heterarchical constitutional principles are chosen as 
examples: the principle of primacy, the interpretation doctrine on conforming 
interpretation, Member States as the masters of the treaties, and the principle of sincere co-
operation. 
 
3.1 The Principle of Primacy  
 
The CJEU has recognised the principle of primacy in its legal praxis. In the case of Costa v 
ENEL, the Court stated that the law stemming from the Treaty could not be overridden by 
domestic legal provisions, however they were framed. As is well known, the Court’s 
interpretation of the primacy of European Union law is based on the direct applicability of 
regulations. The CJEU found that the application of Union law would be contingent if 
Union law did not have primacy over national legislation.17 The primacy of Union law can 
be seen to derive already from the agreements made by the Member States when they joined 
the European Union.18 In the case of the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the CJEU added 
                                                          
15 Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Founding Principles’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), Principles of 
European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing – Verlag CH Beck 2011) 30. 
16 Miguel Poiares Maduro, 'Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as good as it gets?’ in JHH Weiler and 
Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (OUP 2003) 98. 
17 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR I-00585. 
18 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 258. 
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that the EU law has primacy over constitutional principles as well.19 In the case of 
Simmenthal, the Court repeated that the scope of the primacy of European Union law 
extends over all of the Member States’ legislation.20 These cases demonstrate that the 
primacy of Union law extends over all aspects of the national law, including constitutions.  
 
A declaration concerning primacy is annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. It refers to the Court’s 
case law generally.21 There is no particular mention of primacy over constitutions. 
However, the fact that there is a declaration concerning the primacy principle annexed to 
the Lisbon treaty indicates that the principle is widely recognised and accepted by the 
Member States. Nevertheless, the principle’s status in relation to the Member States’ 
constitutions is not clearly defined in the declaration, which simply mentions that the Union 
law has primacy over the laws of the Member States. It is worth pointing out however, that 
as early as in the case of Costa v ENEL, the CJEU stated that primacy concerns national 
legislation ‘however framed’. Even here, the primacy of Union law can be seen to concern all 
national legislation, including constitutions. 
 
The primacy of Union law does not establish any absolute hierarchy of powers between the 
Union and the Member States. The principle of primacy simply expresses a rule concerning 
the application of law between the Union legislation and the Member States’ domestic 
legislation. According to the principle, Union law prevails over national law, but the 
national law will not be declared invalid by the Union Courts22.  From a heterarchical 
perspective, the principle of primacy is not understood to be about the validity of law.23  The 
primacy of Union law simply expresses a rule concerning the application of law in areas where 
the Member States have transferred their powers or competences or sovereignty to the 
Union. The CJEU has stated this in the case IN.CO.GE. When national law is incompatible 
with EU law, the national law does not become ‘non-existent’. Instead the national courts 
must simply ‘disapply that rule’.24 
 
The principle of primacy seems to be somewhat similar in nature to connecting factor rules, 
at least in situations where there is an obvious clash of norms between EU and national law 
provision. However, the principle of primacy is not a connecting factor rule, because it can 
also function as a weighing and balancing principle in cases where the norm conflict can be 
avoided by interpreting national law provisions in line with EU law provisions. In other 
words, the principle of primacy can lead to either EU law-oriented interpretation or, in 
some cases, to the non-application of a provision of national law, leaving the national law 
provision still valid but non-applicable in that particular case. 
 
In situations of norm conflict between national and EU law, the principle of conforming 
interpretation offers an important means to resolve the conflict compared to non-application 
of national law provision. Conforming interpretation means that Member States have an 
obligation to interpret national law harmoniously and in conformity with EU law as far as is 
                                                          
19 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] ECR I-01125, para 3. 
20 Case C-106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR I-00629, para 24. 
21 Declaration Concerning Primacy [2010] OJ C83/33. 
22 Joined Cases C-10 to 22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v INCOGE'90 Srl, Idelgard Srl, Iris'90 Srl, Camed Srl, 
Pomezia Progetti Appalti Srl (PPA), Edilcam Srl, A Cecchini & C Srl, EMO Srl, Emoda Srl, Sappesi Srl, Ing Luigi 
Martini Srl, Giacomo Srl and Mafar Srl [1998] ECR I-06307, para 21. See also Allan Rosas and Lorna Armati, 
EU Constitutional Law, An Introduction (Hart Publishing 2010) 55–56. 
23 Avbelj (n 14) 750–51. 
24 INCOGE'90 (n 22) para 21. 
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possible. If national law cannot be applied in conformity with EU law, such domestic law 
must be held inapplicable.25 Conforming interpretation cannot lead to interpretation of 
national law contra legem.26 In all cases where EU-influenced national law is applied, the 
indirect effect of EU law is at hand regardless of whether the national law in question has or 
has not been amended as a result of the implementation of EU law into national law.27 
Conforming interpretation applies to all EU law28, including provisions which are directly 
applicable or have direct effect. The meaning of conforming interpretation is however 
emphasized in relation to directives. When the indirect effect is given to the EU provision, 
the national provision maintains its position as the provision that is applied primarily.29 In 
the field of criminal law, the principle of legality restricts the indirect effect because criminal 
liability cannot be determined or aggravated on the basis of a framework decision or 
directive alone.30 Thus the interpretation of penal provisions is possible only within the 
wording of a national penal provision.31 The principle of conforming interpretation can be 
seen as an expression of heterarchical structures between EU law and national law as well. 
Its influence and the heterarchical structure might be seen to be at its strongest in the field 
of criminal law because of the principle of legality. 
 
It is essential to distinguish primacy from supremacy, because each has a different 
connotation. Supremacy refers to hierarchical structures between the Union and the 
Member States, to supreme legal acts and to the validity of norms, whereas primacy refers 
to heterarchical structures and to the possible sidelining of norms when laws are applied.32 
Understanding this terminological distinction is relevant to a comprehensive understanding 
of the nature of the EU legal order. 
 
Primacy seems to be the term chosen and used by the CJEU to describe the 
interrelationship between EU law and national law. In the context of the supremacy or 
primacy of the Community or Union law the CJEU seems to have used the English term 
‘supremacy’ or ‘supreme’ in only three cases. In the most recent of these cases (1973), the 
CJEU used the term ‘primacy’ (primauté) in its French-language version. In the other two 
cases, the terms prééminent (adjective) or prééminence sur (noun + preposition) were used in 
the French-language version, which translate into English as pre-eminent, pre-eminence, 
precedence over.  
 
In the case of CILFIT, the CJEU has stated that all language versions are equally authentic 
and that the interpretation of Community or Union law requires a comparison between the 
different language versions. Moreover, EU law needs to be interpreted in the light of the 
provisions of Union law as a whole and the objectives of the Union.33 However, the French 
language has a special position because the CJEU uses French as the common working 
language. Deliberations are taken and judgments are drafted in French. After this, the 
                                                          
25 Case C-157/86 Mary Murphy and others v An Bord Telecom Eireann [1988] ECR 00673, para 11.  
26 Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-05285, paras 43, 47. 
27 Sakari Melander, EU-rikosoikeus (WSOY 2010) 91. 
28 Murphy and others (n 25) para 11.  
29 Juha Raitio, Eurooppaoikeus ja Sisämarkkinat (Talentum 2010) 234–37. 
30 Pupino (n 26) paras 44–45; Case C-14/86 Pretore di Salò v Persons Unknown [1987] ECR 02545, para 20; 
Case C-80/86 Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV [1987] ECR 03969, para 14. 
31 Melander (n 27) 92. 
32 Likewise, Avbelj (n 14) 744. 
33 Case C-283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR I-03415, paras 
17–20. See also Elina Paunio and Susanna Lindroos-Hovinheimo, ‘Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of 
Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law’ (2010) 16 ELJ 395, 396. 
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judgments are translated into the language of the case.34 Therefore, it is useful to compare 
other language versions to the French version. 
 
In the case of Walt Wilhelm, the Court stated that ‘Article 87(2)(E), in conferring on a 
Community institution the power to determine the relationship between national laws and 
the community rules on competition, confirms the supremacy of Community law’. In French 
the phrase is ‘le caractère prééminent du droit communautaire’.35 In case 93/71 the term 
supremacy is among the keywords in the judgment, but appears nowhere else in the text of 
the judgment. The French version of the decision uses the phrase ‘prééminence sur le droit 
interne’,36 which refers to ‘pre-eminence’ or ‘supremacy’ because of the preposition sur, 
equivalent to the English prepositions on, over, upon. In the case of Fratelli Variola, the Court 
has stated that the supremacy of the Community legal system is a fundamental principle of 
Community law. The French version of the judgment uses the phrase ‘le principle 
fundamental de la primauté de l’ordre juridique communautaire’.37 Primauté does not refer to 
‘supremacy’, but to the primacy of the Community legal order instead.   
 
It is undeniable that the Court has sometimes used terminology that can be interpreted as 
referring to ‘supremacy’, at least in the case 93/71. However, the Court has not used the 
English terms ‘supreme’ or ‘supremacy’ in this context since 1973, and the French-language 
version in the case from 1973 refers to ‘primacy’. The UK acceded to the European 
Communities in 197338 and thus the two earlier cases (14/68 and 93/71) have been 
translated into English at a later date.  
 
The plurality of official languages poses a challenge and therefore teleological reasoning is 
essential in interpreting Union law. Owing to the use of several official languages, 
indeterminacy of the meanings of words in the Union law is greater than in national legal 
orders, and it is often difficult to determine precise meanings for words. Teleological 
interpretation in the EU law context guarantees uniform application of EU law at the 
national level better than literal interpretation, for example.39 Teleological interpretation 
aims to fulfil the objective and purpose of the EU treaties and also the effectiveness of EU 
law. The setting of strict hierarchical structures between EU law and national law has 
probably not been the aim behind the primacy case law. Rather its purpose seems to be the 
effectiveness of EU law. The CJEU’s phrasing in Costa v ENEL illustrates this argument 
quite well. The Court stated that ‘[t]he obligations undertaken under the treaty 
establishing the Community would not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they 
could be called in question by subsequent legislative acts of the signatories’.40 
 
In the 2000s, the Court frequently used the term primacy of Community law or, in French, 
primauté du droit communautaire,41 and the term primacy of Union law, or in French principe de 
                                                          
34 Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP 2006) 13. 
35 Case C-14/68 Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR I-00001, para 5. 
36 Case C-93/71 Orsolina Leionesio v Ministro dell’agricoltura e foreste [1972] ECR I-00287. 
37 Case C-34/73 Fratelli Variola SpA v Amministrazione italiana delle Finanze [1973] ECR I-00981, para 15. 
38 [1972] OJ L73. English became an official language of the Communities in 1973. 
39 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ (2007) 1(2) EJLS 1, 6–9. See also Paunio and Lindroos-Hovinheimo (n 33) 397–399, 409. 
40 Costa v ENEL (n 17). 
41 For example Case C-314/08 Krzysztof Filipiak v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Poznaniu [2009] ECR I-11049, 
Case C-2/08 Amministrazione dell’Economia e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle entrate v Fallimento Olimpiclub Srl 
[2009] ECR I-07501, Joined Cases C-392 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany GmbH and Arcor AG & Co KG v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2006] ECR I-08559, Case C-234/04 Rosmarie Kapferer v Schlank & Schick GmbH 
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primauté du droit de l’Union.42 The declaration concerning primacy annexed in the Lisbon 
treaty also uses the term ‘primacy’ instead of ‘supremacy.’ Even if in the late 1960s and early 
1970s the Court might have tried to establish a continual legal praxis on the supremacy of 
Community legal order over national legal orders, it appears as if the phrase ‘primacy of 
Union law’ is preferred today, given the language used in the Court’s case law and in the 
declaration annexed to the Treaties. 
 
3.2 Member States as the Masters of the Treaties 
 
The principle of the Member States as Masters of the Treaties is set out in Article 48 TEU, 
which regulates the amending of the Treaties. Treaty amendments that are made at the 
Intergovernmental Conference (in an ordinary revision procedure) enter into force after 
being ratified by all the Member States (Article 48(4) TEU). The treaty amendments can 
either increase or reduce the Union’s competences. In addition, Article 50 TEU stipulates 
that any Member State can withdraw from the Union. These provisions demonstrate that 
the ultimate power to amend the Union’s constitution and/or to withdraw from the Union 
lies with the Member States. Article 50 TEU is a novelty in the Lisbon treaty.  
 
It could be argued that Article 50 embodies a heterarchical structural idea especially well. A 
State’s belonging or not belonging to the Union is voluntary, and therefore the Union’s 
legal order does not rank higher than the legal order of the Member State. If the EU 
constitutional law had supremacy over national constitutional law, then the option to 
withdraw would not seem to be in line with supremacy. And this rationale supports the 
claim that primacy is a preferred concept for describing the interrelationship between EU 
law and national law. 
 
3.3 Principle of Sincere Cooperation 
 
Article 4(3) TEU stipulates the scope and substance of the principle of sincere cooperation, 
also known as the principle of loyalty. The principle applies to both the Union and the 
Member States. Article 4(3) TEU stipulates that ‘the Union and the Member States shall, in 
full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties’. In 
addition to the Member States and their public authorities, the Union’s institutions must 
follow the principle. This obligation can be seen to include the requirements arising from 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Since the commitment to loyalty is not 
restricted to the Member States only, the principle of sincere cooperation can be seen to 
express a heterarchical structure of the EU legal order. Without the principle of sincere 
cooperation, the binding nature of Union law would lose its meaning, or in other words, be 
inflated. The principle of primacy would also lose its impact. The principle of primacy and 
the principle of sincere cooperation are closely connected, and both foster the effectiveness 
of Union law. 
 
4. PRINCIPLES OF HETERARCHICAL STRUCTURES: ECHR REGIME – 
NATIONAL LAW 
 
Constitutional Status of ECHR Convention System in National Legal Orders. In the case of 
Loizidou, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated that the Convention is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
[2006] ECR I-02585, C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz NV v Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren [2004] ECR I-
00837. 
42 Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten GmbH v Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim [2010] ECR I-08015. 
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a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order’.43 It is not entirely clear, however, 
whether the ECHR has a constitutional status in all of the judicial systems of its contracting 
parties.44 The manner of incorporation of the ECHR (or of international treaties in general) 
varies. Some countries have a monist system, while others have a dualist one. Regardless of 
the manner in which the Convention is accepted into the national legal orders, the ECHR 
has the status of a binding international treaty and the Convention’s norms become part of 
the national legal orders. The hierarchical status of the Convention varies among the 
contracting parties and the Convention affects those contracting parties which are Member 
States of the EU, also via EU law.45  
 
The ECHR concerns human rights issues only and therefore represents a functionalised 
legal regime. If and when the ECHR is considered constitutional by nature, one needs to 
keep in mind that the Convention has no effect on other parts of the constitutions of the 
contracting parties other than human rights and fundamental rights and their monitoring 
systems. 
 
It is reasonable to start by noticing that some scholars find it quite problematic to refer to 
the ECHR as a constitutional document. One problematic aspect is the lack of a separation 
of powers in the ECHR Convention system. The ECtHR functions as a judiciary but the 
contracting parties act as both the legislature (as the constitutional assembly) and the 
executive quarter.46 
 
The status of the ECHR varies considerably from one Contracting Party to another. Some 
contracting parties recognise that the Convention has a constitutional status within their 
legal order.  For example, nowadays Austria finds this as an indisputable fact.47  The 
Austrian Constitutional Court has stated directly that the ECHR has been elevated to 
constitutional status. However, the Austrian Constitutional Court has set limits on the 
authority of the ECHR by declaring that the state authorities are bound to the 
constitutional principle of state organisation even if there would be a discrepancy between 
them and the Convention (‘An die verfassungsrechtlichen Grundsätze der Staatsorganisation ist 
der Gerichtshof aber auch im Falle eines Widerspruches zur Konvention gebunden’).48 In the 
Netherlands, the ECHR even has supraconstitutional status.49  This Article resembles much 
the principle of primacy in EU law: both of them lead to the non-application of 
contradicting national provision but do not nullify the provision in question. 
 
                                                          
43 Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (ECtHR, 23 March 1995), para 75. 
44 Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights – The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal 
Systems (OUP 2008). 
45 Matti Pellonpää and others, Euroopan Ihmisoikeussopimus (Talentum 2012) 47–50; Helen Keller and Alec 
Stone Sweet, ‘Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems’ in Helen Keller and Alec Stone 
Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights – The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (OUP 2008) 683. 
46 Evert Albert Alkema, ‘The European Convention as a Constitution and its Court as a Constitutional Court’ 
in Paul Mahoney and others (eds) Protection des Droits de l’Homme: La Perspective Européenne, Protecting Human 
Rights: The European Perspective – Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns, 2000) 45, 62. 
47 Daniela Thurnherr, ‘The Reception Process in Austria and Switzerland’ in Helen Keller and Alec Stone 
Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights – The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (OUP 2008) 325.  
48Collection number 11500 (Austrian Constitutional Court, 14 October 1987) 3–5 
<http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Vfgh/JFR_10128986_86B00267_01/JFR_10128986_86B00267_01.p
df> accessed 4 May 2013. See also Nico Krisch, ‘The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law’ 
(2007)  LSE Law, Society, and Economy Working Papers 11/2007, 15 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS11-2007Krisch.pdf> accessed 4 May 2013. 
49 The Dutch Constitution of 1983 Article 94. 
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In Finland, the ECHR has been incorporated into national legislation and it has the formal 
status of ordinary law, but the ECHR is seen to have constitutional status only indirectly, 
because the provisions of the ECHR have had a great influence on the Finnish fundamental 
rights reform in 1995 where ECHR provisions were used as examples for new Finnish 
fundamental rights provisions.50 Similarly, Norway and Sweden enacted new statutes in 
order to fill gaps in their constitutions with respect to the ECHR.51  
 
In the Spanish constitution, the ECHR is ranked below the national constitution but above 
(conflicting) national statutes (Articles 95 and 96 of the Spanish Constitution). As far as 
basic rights are concerned, the Spanish constitution stipulates that the provisions 
concerning fundamental rights and liberties will be interpreted in conformity with the 
international treaties, especially ECHR, which Spain has ratified (Article 10 of Spanish 
Constitution).52 In Italy, the ECHR has the status of ordinary law.53  
 
Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet have assessed the impact the ECHR has on national 
legal orders. Even though it might seem rational at first glance that the reception of the 
ECHR would be more effective in monist countries than in dualist countries, Keller and 
Sweet argue that ex ante there is no causal linkage between the monist or dualist posture of 
a state and the effective reception of the ECHR. The effectiveness of the reception of the 
ECHR also depends on what kind of hierarchical status is given to the ECHR in national 
legal orders, which reflects the potential constitutional status of the ECHR. However, what 
really defines the constitutional status of the ECHR is the judicial practice of state parties, 
and not so much how the ECHR has been incorporated into the legal order.54 
 
Regardless of the fact that the ECHR constitutes some kind of surrogate Bill of Rights and 
that it protects more of a minimum standard of human rights and is seen as having a 
complementary or supplementary role in the national system of protection of rights, the 
ECHR may be considered to have a constitutional status in the legal orders of the 
contracting parties.55 The impact of the incorporation of ECHR into national legal orders 
and the way the ECHR regime operates after its transformation through Protocol no 11 
(individual application procedure) supports the claim that the ECHR Convention system 
would be constitutional in nature.56 
 
Some principles of the ECHR regime seem to be essentially heterarchical. These are the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation (and proportionality analysis) and the doctrine on 
equivalent protection. Margin of appreciation is a doctrine that enables flexible co-operation 
between national legal orders and the ECHR regime when the State Parties restrict the 
Convention rights. The doctrine leaves room for State Parties to strike a balance between 
                                                          
50 Pellonpää and others (n 45) 79. 
51 Ola Wiklund, ‘The Reception Process in Sweden and Norway’ in Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A 
Europe of Rights – The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (OUP 2008) 182–184; Alec Stone Sweet, 
‘The European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutional Reordering’ (2012) 33 Cardozo L 
Rev 1859, 1865. 
52 The Spanish Constitution of 1978. See also Mercedes Candela Soriano, ‘The Reception Process in Spain and 
Italy’ in Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights – The Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems (OUP 2008) 403–404; Krisch (n 48) 6. 
53 Candela Soriano (n 52) 403–406. 
54 Keller and Stone Sweet (n 45) 682–86. 
55 ibid 701–06. 
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the common good of society and the rights of individuals,57 as there is room for the national 
authorities to determine whether an interference with the right is ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’.58 The state parties are free to choose the measures they adopt to fulfil the 
obligations deriving from the ECHR.59 The extent of the discretion varies in relation to 
different Articles of the Convention, depending on how detailed the text of the Article is.60 
Moreover, the principle of proportionality imposes limits on the margin of appreciation. 
The doctrine has been developed in order to strike a balance between national views on 
human rights and the uniform application of the Convention.61  
 
Margin of appreciation relates also to a methodological issue concerning the interpretation 
of the Convention as a living instrument. This type of evolutive interpretation was developed 
against the background of the Second World War. The intention behind it was to give 
flexibility to the interpretation of the Convention, bearing in mind that situations which the 
drafters of the Convention could not have foreseen might evolve in the future.62  
 
In Tyrer, the ECtHR stated that ‘the Convention is a living instrument which, as the 
Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’. In 
the Tyrer case, a juvenile court in UK had sentenced a fifteen-year-old citizen to birching. 
The ECtHR evaluated whether birching would constitute inhuman and degrading 
punishment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The ECtHR stated that even 
if judicial corporal punishment would have strong deterrent effects, the Court must be 
influenced by the ‘developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the 
Member States’, thus relying on the methodology of the Convention as a living instrument. 
The Court found that the use of the judicial corporal punishment of birching constituted a 
breach of Article 3 of the Convention.63 The methods of interpretation of the Convention 
can be described as both dynamic and evolutive, and practical and effective.64 The evolutive 
and dynamic approach supports the ECtHR’s case law on margin of appreciation because if 
there were no room for discretion the Convention parties could not interpret the 
Convention in a dynamic and evolutive fashion.  
 
It needs to be kept in mind that even though the Convention needs to be interpreted in a 
dynamic and evolutionary way, the interpretation must be tied to the text of the 
Convention. There are also limitations to the margin of appreciation. The ECtHR has tried 
to bring clarity to the doctrine by introducing a balancing of the importance of the right 
with the importance of the restriction. The margin is narrower if, for example, free speech, 
and especially free political speech, is restricted.65  By contrast, the margin is wider when a 
                                                          
57 Murat Tümay, ‘The “Margin of Appreciation Doctrine” Developed by the Case Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (2008) 5 Ankara L Rev 201, 201. 
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1474/62, 1677/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64 (ECtHR, 23 July 1968), para 10. 
60 Brauch (n 58) 120. 
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state restricts a right in order to protect national security.66 The more consensus there is 
between the ECHR member states on a particular issue, the narrower the margin of 
appreciation is on that issue. By the same token, diversity in understanding a particular 
issue increases the margin of appreciation. This latter limitation is, to some extent, difficult 
to determine precisely. Is there a need for European consensus or international consensus? 
When is consensus at hand, when can we recognise it, and ultimately, who decides?67 
Margin of appreciation expresses acceptance of pluralism of legal orders and it enables 
flexible co-operation between the legal orders. Thus, margin of appreciation could be seen 
to represent a heterarchical constitutional structure pertaining between the ECHR 
Convention system and national legal orders.  
  
5. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF EU LAW AND ECHR CONVENTION SYSTEM 
 
Protection of fundamental and human rights entered into EU law as a result of the 
supremacy/primacy case law. The protection of fundamental and human rights in Union 
law increases the acceptability of the primacy doctrine68 by assuring the Member States that 
the Community guarantees fundamental and human rights while Community law is applied.  
 
5.1 Current Interrelationship of EU Law and the ECHR Convention System – The 
Situation Before the EU’s Accession to the ECHR: Doctrine of Equivalent Protection  
 
In the Kadi case the CJEU has given guidelines concerning the interrelationship of Union 
law and international law from the Union’s perspective. The Union must respect 
international law69. However, from the CJEU’s perspective, the Union’s constitutional 
principles have primacy over international law obligations ‘[…] an international agreement 
cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which 
include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect 
constituting a condition for their lawfulness […]’.70  
 
The CJEU’s rulings are effective only within the Union’s municipal legal order. Therefore, 
conflicts in the obligations of the Member States of the Union in the arena of international 
law will be solved by the rules of public international law.71  This means that a separation 
must be made between conflicts of Union law and international law within the Union legal 
order and of those possible conflicts the Member States face because the Member States 
ought to respect both their obligations to the Union and the obligations deriving from other 
international treaties. This also means that CJEU can give judgments concerning the 
interpretation of EU law but the EU Member States need to ensure that they comply with 
their obligations deriving from both EU law and international law. 
 
                                                          
66 Klass and Others v Germany App no 5029/71 (ECtHR, 6 September 1978), paras 49–50, 59–60. See also 
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The rules of public international law can be found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties72 (VCLT) for example. The VCLT applies to treaties made between states (Article 
1)73. According to Article 27 of VCLT, ‘a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’. Therefore it can be argued that a 
Member State of the EU cannot invoke regional Union law provisions, which are directly 
applicable or have been implemented by the Member States, as justification for its failure to 
perform some other obligations it has based on international treaty. Since EU law can be 
perceived to be an integral part of the Member States’ legal orders, the interpretation that 
Union law could be parallel with Member States’ domestic law within the scope of Article 
27 VCLT can be seen as a valid argument. 
 
Article 351 of TFEU regulates the status of agreements that are concluded before 1 January 
1958, or for acceding States, before the date of their accession. The rights and obligations 
arising from those agreements are not affected by the provisions of the Treaties.74 This 
means that if a EU Member State has ratified the ECHR before its EU membership, there 
will be no changes to the obligations deriving from the ECHR Convention system. 
However, the EU Member States are obliged to ‘take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibilities established’ (Article 351(2) TFEU). This provision expresses the more 
general principle of loyalty. EU Member States ought to realise their obligations deriving 
from both EU law and international law to the fullest. Article 351 TFEU and the 
embodiment of the principle of loyalty it contains demonstrates heterarchical constitutional 
structures between EU law and international law from the EU law perspective. 
 
The ECtHR has had cases concerning the question of whether an EU Member State has 
violated the ECHR by simply implementing Union law.75 In Matthews, the ECtHR stated 
that even though EU Member States have subsequent obligations arising from the Union 
treaties, they still have the responsibility to execute their obligations arising from the 
ECHR.76 In Bosphorus, the ECtHR stated:  
 
[A] Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and 
omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a 
consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal 
obligations. (…) The state is considered to retain Convention liability in respect of treaty 
commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention.77  
 
This conclusion is consistent with the Article 351 TFEU described above. 
 
In the Bosphorus case, the ECtHR also created a doctrine of equivalent protection of human 
rights according to which state actions taken in compliance with legal obligations such as 
those deriving from Union membership are justified as long as the organisation in question 
is considered to protect fundamental rights. The protection must cover both the substantive 
guarantees and the mechanisms controlling their observance. The protection ought to be 
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considered as at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides. If the protection 
provided by the organisation is seen to be equivalent, the presumption will be that a state 
has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than 
implement legal obligations deriving from its membership in the organisation. The ECtHR 
has specifically stated that protection of fundamental rights in EU law can be considered 
equivalent to that of the Convention system.78 
 
It is worth noting that any such equivalence is not considered to be continual 
unconditionally. Any findings of equivalence can be reviewed if there are relevant changes 
in the protection of fundamental rights. A presumption of equivalence can be rebutted if the 
protection of Convention rights is seen to be manifestly deficient when considered in the 
light of the circumstances of a particular case. The equivalence of EU law with the ECHR 
that was found in the Bosphorus case was reasoned inter alia by stating that the Charter 
might become part of the Union’s primary law.79 Since the Charter nowadays has the same 
legal value as the Treaties, the presumption of equivalence is arguably quite strong.  
 
It could be argued that nowadays the presumption of equivalence symbolises a heterarchical 
structure between the EU legal order and the ECHR Convention system. It has brought 
flexibility to the interrelationship of these two European legal systems by the presumption 
that the EU does respect fundamental and human rights because it is founded by the 
Member States as the framework for co-operation and because the legitimacy of EU law is 
ultimately reliant on the approval of the Member States. 
 
5.2 The Relationship between EU Law and the ECHR after the EU’s Accession to the 
Convention: Normalisation and Margin of Appreciation  
 
According to Article 6(2) TEU, the Union shall accede to the ECHR. The Steering 
Committee for Human Rights has given a report to the Committee of Ministers concerning 
the Union’s accession to ECHR.80  The next presentation is heavily based on that report. As 
far as possible, the Union ought to have the same rights and obligations as the other 
Contracting Parties.81 Accession to the ECHR would mean that all acts, measures and 
omissions of the Union, will be subject to the control exercised by the ECtHR,82 and that 
the decisions of the ECtHR, in cases to which EU is a party, will be binding on all of the 
EU’s institutions, including the CJEU.83 
 
The case law concerning the presumption of equivalence that was established in the 
Bosphorus case might come to lose its meaning in relation to EU law. If the presumption of 
equivalence were to remain, it would establish unequal standing between the different 
parties, because EU would be privileged by it.84 The ECtHR might renounce the Bosphorus 
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case law after EU’s accession85 which would bring EU in line with the other parties of 
ECHR. This might be preferable following already from the Draft Accession Agreement 
explanatory report, according to which the Convention control mechanism should be 
applied to the EU, as a main rule, in the same way as it applies to the other contracting 
parties.86 The Draft Accession Agreement remains unclear on the matter, which means that 
the ECtHR can return to the issue later on.87 
 
The Draft Accession Agreement enables the ECtHR to review EU primary law.88 The 
Court could, however, only investigate whether EU law is compatible with the Convention. 
In other words, it could not declare provisions of EU law invalid. This means that the 
exclusive jurisdiction and interpretative autonomy of EU law would remain with the 
CJEU.89 The Draft Accession Agreement also clarifies circumstances in which the CJEU 
can review EU law-related cases before of the review of the ECtHR. The main rule is that 
the applicant must exhaust only the remedies in the legal order of the main respondent, 
whether it is the EU or an EU Member State, but not the remedies of the co-respondent. If 
the EU is the main respondent, the applicant must first exhaust all remedies in the EU legal 
order, which are the general court and the CJEU. If the EU is a co-respondent (meaning 
that the main respondent is an EU Member State; the status of co-respondent is voluntary), 
the CJEU can review the case before the ECtHR reviews it. Equally, if the EU is not a co-
respondent in a case where an EU Member State is the main respondent, the CJEU cannot 
review the case. In such situations the only way the CJEU could have reviewed the case 
would be if a national court had asked for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU at an earlier 
stage during the national proceedings.90 
 
If the Union’s accession to the ECHR complies with this draft agreement made by the 
Steering Committee, the Union would have the same obligations as the State parties of the 
Convention. This could mean that there could be changes in the interpretation of some 
provisions of Union instruments. For example, human rights violations could be seen as an 
excuse to not surrender a person to another state based on the issue of a European arrest 
warrant (EAW), because EU law ought to comply with the ECHR91. Differences in national 
law, or regional transnational law, compared to the Convention are not acceptable excuses 
for not complying with the Convention.  
 
The whole idea of the Convention is to bring coherence to the protection of human rights in 
the European area. The Union’s accession would enhance this coherence.92 Following 
accession, the doctrine on equivalent protection concerning EU law might get renounced by 
the ECtHR for the sake of equal standing of the Convention contracting parties. The EU’s 
position as a contracting party would thus become normal when compared to the state 
parties. The Union would have negative and positive obligations arising from the 
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Convention, and it would have the same margin of appreciation in fulfilling its obligations 
as the state parties have.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The various European legal systems are linked in complex ways. This contribution aimed to 
clarify some of those linkages. Constitutions at the European level have been given only 
some of the functions traditionally held by national constitutions. Given key differences 
between European and national constitutional functions, how should the norms described in 
the previous sections be modelled? This section reflects on the meaning and influence of 
heterarchical constitutional structures and draws some tentative conclusions. However, 
further study on their influence would be welcome. What is the purpose of such structures? 
How do these structures manifest themselves in different branches of law? Criminal law is 
used as an example when answering these questions because of its close connections to 
national sovereignty and constitutional law. Criminal law is also a good example because 
the principle of legality imposes fairly strict requirements for the ways in which criminal 
law may be applied. 
 
EU constitutionalism differs from state constitutionalism in at least one vital aspect. State 
constitutionalism is about imposing limitations on the use of power and of hierarchical 
structures within the polity. EU constitutionalism is, in addition to these, about 
heterarchical constitutional structures between the EU polity and the individual Member 
States. Neither the Union nor the Member States occupy an absolute higher hierarchical 
level in the constitutional structure. Rather, the common constitutional framework for the 
Union and the Member States could be described as parallel, complementary or integral. 
 
The heterarchical constitutional principles described above, mainly the principle of primacy 
and the doctrine concerning margin of appreciation, aim at flexible co-operation between 
different legal orders. This reduces the need to create new rules simply to connect different 
constitutional orders. Heterarchical principles are principles properly so called: they are 
more open to case-specific interpretation than strict rules. This is both their strength, and 
their weakness. 
 
A concept of deep pluralism has been used to describe a situation ‘where actors of each legal 
order proceed without systemic regard for the coherence of the whole’.93 Flexible 
heterarchical constitutional structures which facilitate cooperation between the EU and its 
Member States contribute to deepening cooperation without clearly defining the 
constitutional relationship. Some preliminary steps have been taken towards a more clearly 
defined relationship. For example, the declaration concerning primacy has been annexed to 
the Lisbon Treaty. Article 6(2) TEU now explicitly stipulates that the Union shall accede to 
the ECHR convention. 
 
Special characteristics of national constitutions can flourish within the European 
constitutional setting. Article 4(2) TEU states that the EU respects the national identities 
of the Member States. Heterarchical constitutional principles emphasise voluntariness in the 
relationship between the EU and the Member States. Article 50 TEU makes it possible for 
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the Member States to leave the Union.94 Thus, EU law must be acceptable in order to 
legitimize its position in the material sense, as well as its role in the national legal orders. 
Article 67(1) expresses respect for different legal systems and traditions of the Member 
States in the context of criminal law cooperation.  
 
The principle of conforming interpretation gives an important role to national legislation. 
The field of criminal law is sensitive from the perspective of national sovereignty. The use 
of conforming interpretation is therefore restricted in this context, as presented above in 
section three. A framework decision or a directive cannot independently determine or 
aggravate criminal liability.95 Therefore the principle of primacy should not to be 
considered absolute. The principle of primacy is applied only after determining that national 
legislation cannot be interpreted harmoniously with EU law in the case in question. In cases 
where national legislation and its EU law-oriented interpretation do not allow 
determination or aggravation of criminal liability, the principle of primacy cannot be used as 
an alternative means for determining or aggravating criminal liability. In cases like these, 
limits to the use of conforming interpretation and the restriction on the principle of primacy 
expresses one of the sub-principles of the principle of legality: the principle of strict 
construction, also known as the prohibition of analogous application to the detriment of the 
accused (nulla poena sine lege stricta). The limits to the use of the principle of conforming 
interpretation and the restriction on the principle of primacy in the field of criminal law also 
represent heterarchical structures between the EU legal order and the national legal orders 
quite well since the restrictions show that strict preset hierarchical structures have not been 
established between the orders. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty also introduced the so-called emergency brake procedure. Article 82(3) 
TEU (concerning procedural cooperation) and Article 83(3) TEU (concerning the 
approximation of substantive criminal law) are likely to prevent situations described in the 
paragraph above where the EU legislator might otherwise create criminal legislation which 
Member States consider excessive.96 The emergency brake procedure can be seen as a more 
efficient expression of the more general principle of subsidiarity in fields of shared 
competence such as criminal law. In the fields of shared competence draft legislative acts are 
forwarded to national Parliaments so that they can review whether the draft legislative act 
is in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity.97 If at least a quarter of the votes given to 
the Parliaments declare that proposed criminal legislation does not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity, the draft will be reviewed.98  
 
In the emergency break procedure, where an EU Member State considers that ‘a draft 
directive would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system’, it can ask for a 
referral to the European Council. This suspends the ordinary legislative procedure. The 
wording that is used, ‘fundamental aspects of criminal justice system’, seems to leave quite a 
wide margin of appreciation for the Member States to use the emergency brake. Before the 
Lisbon Treaty, there was no need for an emergency break because third pillar instruments 
                                                          
94 What obligations the Member States would have to fulfill if they wish to leave the Union is another 
question. 
95 Pretore di Salò (n 30) para 20; Kolpinghuis (n 30) para 14; Pupino (n 26) paras 44–45. 
96 Of course this does not affect to the possibility that the implementation acts by the Member States can be 
delayed. 
97 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality [2012] OJ C326/206, 
Article 6. 
98 ibid Article 7(2). 
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required unanimity.99 The wording of the emergency brake procedure now clearly 
acknowledges that there are differences between national criminal justice systems. The 
emergency brake procedure enables discussions concerning the proposed directive in the 
European Council. A consensus is required for the determination of the suspension of the 
legislative process. Thus the procedure creates material legitimacy for the directive. 
  
The limited scope for employing conforming interpretations or primacy in the field of 
criminal law as well as the emergency brake procedure in the EU criminal law legal bases 
show that cooperation within the EU framework is quite flexible and also takes national 
special characteristics into account. The use of mutual recognition as the primary 
principle100 for cooperation in criminal matters also expresses the heterarchical nature of 
such cooperation. Heterarchical constitutional principles are elastic. They enable flexibility 
in cooperation. Heterarchical principles bring legitimacy to EU criminal law legislation 
because they take into account national specificities. Deeper studies on the influence of 
heterarchical constitutional structures in the field of criminal law, and in other fields, are 
required.   
 
The picture formed by the constitutions of the individual Member States, the EU and the 
ECHR convention system can be seen as a dynamic whole. On one hand the CJEU considers 
the ECHR and the ECtHR case law101 as an important and fundamental source for its own 
argumentation. At the same time, the ECHR case law concerning the principle of equivalent 
protection has simplified transnational cooperation for Member States that are 
implementing, interpreting and enforcing these European norms. Both European courts 
seem to take the special characteristics of the other system into account.  
 
Two further general conclusions can be drawn. First, the formal status of the European 
regional legal orders in the national legal orders is not the determining factor when 
assessing their influence on national legal orders. How the European regional legal orders 
are valued and how effectively they are applied in national legal practices are of greater 
importance. Second, the doctrine of sources of law needs to be reconsidered. A doctrine of 
sources in European law should not aim to establish a strict hierarchical model 
encompassing the different legal orders. Instead, more weight ought to be given to the 
different communicative principles between the legal orders, such as the principle of primacy 
and the doctrine of margin of appreciation. National legislation differs from European 
regional legal orders in that it functions as the framework and infrastructure for the 
European regional legal orders. Different legal orders do not need to be hierarchically 
interrelated, even though each of the systems has an internal hierarchy of norms. This 
demonstrates that different communicative principles apply between the legal orders.  
 
 
                                                          
99 Petter Asp, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU (Jure Förlag 2012) 140.  
100 Presidency Conclusions Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, para 33. 
101 For example concerning the principle of legality see case of C-63/83 Regina v Kirk [1984] ECR I-02689, 
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